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Safety standards and indigenous products: 
what role for traditional knowledge?
Meredith Kolsky Lewis
I Introduction
Indigenous communities have used native plants as foods and for medi-
cinal purposes for thousands of years. Some of these indigenous products1 
have proven sufficiently popular that individuals outside the indigenous 
community have sought to consume, purchase and market them. In cer-
tain instances, new products have been derived from the indigenous plant 
and sold outside the indigenous community.2 In other cases, the indigen-
ous product has been exported in its original form, but utilized in non-
traditional ways in the export market.3 In recent years, various WtO 
Members have imposed bans and other restrictions on the importation 
of certain indigenous products on the basis of health and safety concerns. 
These restrictions tend to be blanket bans on the products as a whole, thus 
curtailing both the ability to consume indigenous products according to 
their traditional uses, as well as the adapted versions of such products.
This chapter uses the example of the recent bans on kava from Pacific 
Island countries as context to argue that the safety of indigenous prod-
ucts with long histories of traditional use should be evaluated on their 
own merits. They should not be deemed the equivalent of new products 
with new uses that have been adapted from the indigenous plant, nor 
should their safety be assessed in combination with such new products. 
Bans on indigenous products may well be overbroad if they do not differ-
entiate between traditional (quite possibly safe) uses and new (perhaps 
1 In this chapter ‘indigenous products’ refers to plants and products derived from plants 
that are indigenous to a single country or a small subset of countries.
2 Kava, indigenous to the Pacific Islands and discussed throughout this chapter, is an 
example.
3 an example of this is the use of tea tree oil, a product derived from melaleuca alternifolia 
which is indigenous to New South Wales, australia.
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not-so-safe) uses. The World trade Organization’s (WtO) Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures agreement (SPS agreement)4 applies inter alia 
to most food safety regulations. The SPS agreement should not be inter-
preted to permit Members to apply undifferentiated bans to traditional 
and non-traditional uses of an indigenous product. Instead, WtO 
 Members should be required to separately assess the safety of the trad-
itional use so as to minimize the potential for overbroad, unduly trade-
restrictive regulations.
This contention may be controversial – to the extent national auton-
omy issues are raised in the SPS context it is generally to voice concern 
that national autonomy is being unduly curtailed. Commentators and 
government officials regularly assert that the SPS agreement should 
be interpreted with significant deference to the regulating Member, so 
that Members can make their own decisions about risk and the safety 
 measures necessary to suit the particular needs and desires of their 
populations.5 In this chapter I take a different approach, and argue that, 
at least in the context of the safety of indigenous plant products, there 
may at present be too much flexibility for Members. The kava example 
demonstrates that indigenous products with traditional uses are being 
affected by safety concerns arising from adaptations or new uses of these 
indigenous products. This is problematic because the traditional uses 
have demonstrated indicia of safety by virtue of their enduring use, yet 
for purposes of risk assessments and safety analyses the traditional uses 
are being lumped together with the new, adapted uses by overseas regu-
lators. This chapter suggests a conceptual framework for addressing this 
problem so as to strike a better balance between appropriate safety meas-
ures and national regulatory autonomy.
I am not advocating changing the basic principles of the SPS 
agreement,6 which allows Members to identify their own level of ac-
ceptable risk and to tailor their safety measures accordingly. Nor am I 
4 agreement on the application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, agreement 
Establishing the World trade Organization, annex 1a, (1994) 33 ILM 1125, (15 april 
1994) [hereinafter ‘SPS agreement’].
5 For example, in the Hormones dispute the European Communities argued that the panel 
had accorded insufficient deference to the EC’s SPS measures. See appellate Body report, 
European Communities – Measures Affecting Meat and Meat Products (EC – Hormones), 
Wt/DS26/aB/r, adopted 13 February 1998, para. 13.
6 as is discussed more fully in Section III, the technical Barriers to trade (tBt) agreement 
and the Gatt may also be applicable to some regulations on kava. Due to space con-
straints and the fact that most kava-related regulations are SPS rather than tBt measures, 
however, this chapter will primarily address SPS-related issues.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Safety standards and indigenous products 171
suggesting that, merely because indigenous products have a long history 
of use, they must be safe. However, there should be some process by which 
the traditional use is taken into account. Otherwise indigenous products 
with hundreds of years of use end up being treated like brand-new prod-
ucts, which is inappropriate, given the different historical records the 
two categories of products have.
The chapter suggests that the concept of ‘traditional knowledge’ (tK), 
which in the WtO realm has thus far primarily been limited in appli-
cation to the intellectual property (IP)/trIPS context, could be applied 
usefully in the SPS context to differentiate the status that should be 
afforded to the traditional uses of indigenous products as compared with 
their newer, adapted uses. to the extent issue is taken with applying this 
IP term to the health and safety context, I would not quibble with assign-
ing another term, so long as the intended meaning remained the same. 
However, I believe ‘traditional knowledge’ as a concept can and should 
translate into the SPS context, and expanding our conception of tK may 
assist developing countries in expanding their exports as well as provid-
ing recognition and compensation for inventions and other innov ations 
arising from indigenous communities. Section II of the chapter provides 
an overview of the Pacific Islands’ experience with kava exports. Section 
III discusses the legal framework relevant to regulating indigenous plant 
products. Section IV assesses potential methods for preventing a repeat 
of the kava experience, and Section V argues that the concept of trad-
itional knowledge should be extended to the SPS context to provide a 
better framework for assessing the risk of products with a history of 
 traditional use.
II Too much regulatory autonomy?  
The Pacific Islands’ kava experience
Background
‘Kava’ is the name for a drink reported to have relaxant as well as other 
favourable characteristics, and is made from the water extracts of the rhi-
zome or root of the Piper methysticum plant.7 Kava and kava-containing 
products originate primarily from Pacific Island (PI) countries, including 
7 This plant has also been referred to as ‘kava’ and ‘kava-kava’, particularly in Western 
countries. See World Health Organization, ‘assessment of the risk of Hepatotoxicity with 
Kava Products’, (2007), p. 4 [hereinafter ‘WHO assessment’].
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Fiji, Samoa, Vanuatu, tonga and Solomon Islands.8 These countries face 
significant obstacles to participating actively in the international trad-
ing system. all of the major kava-exporting countries are ‘small island 
 developing states’,9 and Samoa, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu are least 
developed countries (LDCs).10
Kava has been used as a relaxant for many generations by the Pacific 
communities to which it is indigenous. The traditional use of kava, dat-
ing back hundreds of years, is to mix a powdered form of the plant 
root with water and to drink this mixture.11 More recently there has 
been interest in kava for its medicinal properties, and importing coun-
tries have made various new uses of the kava plant. Kava and kava-
 containing products have been exported to overseas markets and 
marketed as alternatives to pharmaceutical tranquillizers and other 
relaxants. Unlike the water extracts traditionally used within the 
Pacific, in more recent years the European pharmaceutical compan-
ies have used acetone or ethanol to extract non-water-soluble, pharma-
cologically active, organic compounds (called kava lactones) from the 
kava plant, and processed them in concentrated form into capsules and 
pills.12 Thus European kava products have contained compounds not 
present in the traditional drink of water-soluble kava compounds. In 
addition, European companies extracted lactones from stem peelings 
from the kava plant – a part of the plant not commonly used to make 
the  traditional kava drink.13 
Exports of kava led to growth in the local industries, particularly in Fiji 
and Samoa. a significant amount of land was dedicated to growing more 
kava as the overseas markets expanded.14 Earnings were substantial. Fiji 
 8 among the major kava exporters, Fiji, Solomon Islands and tonga are WtO Members. 
Vanuatu and Samoa have not yet completed the WtO accession process and currently 
have observer status.
 9 United Nations Office of the High representative for the Least Developed Countries, 
Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States, www.un.org/
special-rep/ohrlls/lldc/default.htm (accessed 9 December 2009).
10 The WtO recognizes as LDCs the countries so-designated by the United Nations. See 
‘Understanding the WtO: Least Developed Countries’, available at www.wto.org/ 
english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org7_e.htm (accessed 9 December 2009). The United 
Nations currently identifies 49 countries as LDCs. See www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/
related/62/ (accessed 9 December 2009).
11 WHO assessment, supra, note 7, p. 7. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid., p. 8.
14 Dr J. Gruenwald, Dr C. Mueller and J. Skrabal, Phytopharm Consulting, ‘Kava report 
2003: In-Depth Investigation into EU Member States Market restrictions on Kava 
Products – Part I: Situation analysis’, prepared for the Centre for the Development of 
Enterprise (Brussels, March 2003), p. I-10 [hereinafter ‘Kava report 2003’].
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was the largest exporter of kava and in the late 1990s was earning over 
US$50 million per year.
Alarm bells
although kava in its traditional drink form has been consumed in the 
Pacific for thousands of years without any association with liver disease,15 
starting in 2000, Germany’s Federal Institute for Drugs and Medical 
Devices, known as BfarM, drew a correlation between consumption of 
kava and severe liver problems.16 This ultimately led Germany, France and 
several other countries to ban kava imports beginning in 2002, on the 
basis that these products’ use was correlated with hepatotoxicity, and a 
number of other governments followed suit shortly thereafter with bans or 
other regulatory restrictions.17 These actions were all primarily based on 
the German data and some additional reports coming from Switzerland 
and the United Kingdom.18 The cumulative effect was significant and, 
unsurprisingly, was highly damaging for the Pacific Island communities 
that had been generating significant sources of export income based on 
kava.19
On initial consideration, the bans and other restrictions may seem just-
ified. Liver failure is a significant problem and cannot be disregarded just 
because the product is coming from developing countries. and indeed 
WtO Members are permitted under the SPS agreement to impose 
import restrictions on products that have been the subject of a scientific 
risk assessment and deemed too dangerous to meet the levels of protec-
tion the importing country wishes to impose. The SPS agreement also 
allows temporary measures to be imposed while the safety of a product is 
being established.20 However, on further reflection these measures raise 
some significant concerns.
Based on publicly available materials, it appears that in enacting these 
kava import bans, the importing countries did not distinguish between 
the safety of kava prepared in the traditional way as a drink and the safety 
15 Ibid., p. 5. 16 WHO assessment, supra, note 7, p. 56.
17 WHO assessment, supra, note 7, pp. 55–6. Some countries issued warnings or voluntary 
recalls rather than imposing bans. Ibid., pp. 56–7. For a comprehensive summary of the 
measures adopted worldwide, see Kava report 2003, supra, note 14.
18 WHO assessment, supra, note 7, pp. 55–7.
19 For a discussion of the economic impact of the kava restrictions, see Kava report 2003, 
supra, note 14, p. I-10.
20 SPS agreement, supra, note 4, article 5.7.
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of any of the more recent pharmacological adaptations. as an example, in 
a 2002 notification to the WtO’s SPS Committee, the United Kingdom 
notified emergency measures to ban kava importation and sale on grounds 
of food safety. The notification identifies evidence linking consumption of 
medicinal kava with liver damage and then notes that it proposes to ban 
both medicinal and food uses of kava because ‘there is no clear under-
standing of the nature of the hepatotoxicity, including its mechanism. 
Consequently, the FSa [Food Standards agency] is proposing to prohibit 
food uses of Kava-kava.’21 Other countries soon followed suit.22 The bans 
were highly controversial because of the significant adverse effects they 
had on the Pacific Island economies and the belief that the evidence of 
liver toxicity from kava was unsubstantiated.23
Thus, kava and kava products used in the traditional manner, which 
has a very long history of apparently safe use, were lumped together with 
newer, untraditional uses, and all classified as unsafe. This had devastat-
ing consequences for Pacific Island kava producers.
The long road to exoneration
Market access for traditional products is of critical importance to small 
states such as the Pacific Islands because these countries have only limited 
potential to generate export earnings. In this regard the Commonwealth 
countries specifically identified the kava ban as an issue that required 
expeditious resolution.24 Despite this urgency, Pacific Island countries 
had to spend several years attempting to get the bans overturned.25 The 
affected countries sought relief through the africa-Caribbean-Pacific 
21 Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, ‘Notification of Emergency 
Measures’, (WtO Doc. G/SPS/N/GBr/3, 2002).
22 WHO assessment, supra, note 7, pp. 55–7.
23 See generally the historical background provided by the International Kava Executive 
Council (IKEC) at www.ikec.org/history/index.html (accessed 9 December 2009).
24 abuja Communiqué, Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, (8 December 
2003), para. 61.
25 For a chronology of the kava bans and some of the efforts to get them lifted, see Pacific 
Network on Globalisation, ‘Lift the Kava Ban Now – Provide an Economic Lifeline for the 
Pacific!’, (September 2007), available at www.pang.org.fj/22.html (accessed 9 December 
2009). This call for re-examination of kava bans and restrictions does seem to have led 
Germany to alter its ban in 2005, but this was only a nominal change as Germany was 
still determining on a case-by-case basis whether the ban for individual licences to sell 
kava products would be lifted. The ban on importing kava products remained intact. See, 
for example, M. Blumenthal, ‘German Government reconsiders Kava’, HerbalGram, 67 
(2005) 21; W. Morgan, ‘time to End Kava trade Ban’, Fiji Times, (23 September 2007), 
available at www.fijitimes.com/story.aspx?id=71049 (accessed 9 December 2009).
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(aCP) dialogue with the European Union, raising the issue at an aCP-EU 
Joint Parliamentary assembly in 2004. This resulted in some cosmetic 
policy changes, but the bans effectively remained in place.26 
The Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, together with sympathetic 
European manufacturers and marketers, also established a joint repre-
sentative body – the International Kava Executive Council (IKEC) – to 
attempt to re-establish kava trade between the Pacific and the EU.27 IKEC 
commissioned a study on the safety of kava and sought legal advice from 
the advisory Centre on WtO Law in Geneva with respect to PI countries’ 
rights.28
after a significant amount of agitation by various interested parties, 
the World Health Organization (WHO) established an expert committee 
to review the alleged liver toxicity effects of medicinal kava products. This 
report was completed in 2007 and found that ‘it is clear that water extracts 
as taken in the South Pacific, with hardly any serious kava-related hepato-
toxicity reported, are chemically different from the “kava” used to make 
kava pills in Europe and this difference could be responsible for the reported 
hepatotoxicity in some kava pill takers’.29 It concluded that the incidence of 
hepatotoxicity with kava is uncommon or rare, and that the small level of 
risk could be reduced by taking precautions such as using water-based 
suspensions of kava and avoiding acetonic and alcoholic extracts.30
Following the issuance of the WHO report, IKEC and others threat-
ened to initiate WtO dispute settlement proceedings if the bans were not 
lifted.31 Finally, in November 2008, the European Commission lifted its 
ban on kava.32 
26 aCP-EU Joint Parliamentary assembly, ‘resolution on Cotton and other 
Commodities: Problems Encountered by aCP States’, aCP-EU Doc. 3668/04/fin, 
adopted in addis ababa, (19 February 2004). This call for re-examination of kava bans 
and restrictions does seem to have led Germany to alter its ban in 2005, but this was only 
a nominal change as Germany was still determining on a case-by-case basis whether the 
ban for individual licenses to sell kava products would be lifted. The ban on importing 
kava products remained intact.
27 See generally www.ikec.org/ (accessed 9 December 2009).
28 Kava report 2003, supra, note 14; see also C. Bowman, ‘Pacific Island Nations: towards 
Shared representation’ in P. Gallagher, P. Low and a. L. Stoler (eds.), Managing the 
Challenges of WTO Participation (Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 450, at p. 455.
29 Kava report 2003, supra, note 14, p. 8. 30 WHO assessment, supra, note 7, pp. 62–3.
31 See, for example, radio New Zealand International (2007), ‘Europe Gets One Last Chance 
to Lift Kava Ban before Pacific Producers Seek Help from WtO’, available at www.rnzi.
com/pages/news.php?op=read&id=33852 (accessed 9 December 2009).
32 IKEC, ‘Lifting the German “Ban” on Kava Exports – Outcome and Strategies of IKEC-EU 
Consultations’, Press release, (29 October 2008), available at www.acp-eu-trade.org/
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‘Success’
It has been suggested by some that the kava experience represents a major 
victory for small vulnerable states and that the regional and international 
cooperative efforts were a model to follow in the event of future similar 
conflicts.33
On the one hand, these platitudes are of course warranted. It is a 
 positive development that many of the bans have been lifted and that 
the PI economies can resume exporting lucrative products. On the 
other hand, however, this experience arguably should not be seen as 
a  success story or a model process at all. It took over six years for the 
ban on kava products to be lifted, even with the efforts of IKEC and 
the Pacific Islands Forum representative Office, both of which receive 
funding from developed countries. This is a very long time for small 
countries to be deprived of a major source of revenue, particularly 
given that, in the end, the traditional use of the product was essentially 
vindicated.
While the ultimate victory is positive, many exporters went out of busi-
ness and suffered significant personal hardship. although the European 
Commission lifted their ban without the need for Fiji to formally initiate 
WtO dispute settlement proceedings, it is deeply concerning that there 
was not a more streamlined way for small, vulnerable WtO Members 
such as Fiji to demonstrate the safety of their exports. This is particularly 
troubling, given that kava has been used in a traditional form for a trad-
itional purpose for hundreds if not thousands of years. While there may 
have been legitimate cause for concern – even if ultimately unfounded – 
with respect to the adapted uses of kava, it appears overbroad to assess 
risk based on the adapted uses, and then to apply restrictions indiscrim-
inately to all kava products. 
library/files/IKEC_EN_291008_IKEC_Lifting-the-German-ban-on-Kava-exports.
pdf (accessed 9 December 2009). although the EU lifted its kava ban, some restrictions 
remain elsewhere. For example, australia still has a ban in effect, see www.bilaterals.
org/article.php3?id_article=13224&var_recherche=sparteca (accessed 9 December 
2009).
33 See, for example, Bowman, supra, note 28 (discussing the benefits for the Pacific Island 
WtO Members of having the Pacific Islands Forum representative Office assist with 
participating in WtO negotiations and resolving disputes on a regional rather than a 
country-specific basis); http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2008/11/kava.html 
(International Economic Law and Policy blog entry characterizing the lifting of the kava 
ban as an indication that the WtO ‘can work for the little guy’) (accessed 9 December 
2009).
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III The WTO framework for regulating indigenous products
In assessing the kava experience and how to avoid its recurrence, it is 
instructive to examine how the regulation of indigenous products fits 
within the WtO framework.
Which agreement applies?
The question of which WtO rules will apply to regulation of indigen-
ous products depends in part on whether the products are classified as 
foods or drugs. If a traditional health product is deemed a food, regula-
tions affecting its importation will fall under the SPS agreement. If, how-
ever, the product is deemed to be a drug or medicinal product, regulations 
affecting its importation more likely fall under the technical Barriers 
to trade (tBt) agreement. It is also possible that a regulation impact-
ing traditional herbal products could fall outside the scope of the tBt 
agreement (and therefore the SPS agreement), in which case there could 
still be a Gatt violation.34 Furthermore, it would seem that, based on the 
recognition of cumulative obligations under multiple WtO agreements,35 
it would be possible for a regulation relating to an indigenous product to 
be partly an SPS measure and partly a tBt measure at the same time, 
and to therefore be subject simultaneously to the disciplines of both 
agreements.36
In practice, kava has sometimes been classified as a food and some-
times as a drug, depending on the country imposing the regulations as 
34 For discussions of the interplay between the SPS agreement, tBt agreement and Gatt, 
see P. Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization (Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), pp. 458–61; G. Marceau and J. trachtman, ‘The technical 
Barriers to trade agreement, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures agreement, 
and the General agreement on tariffs and trade’, Journal of World Trade, 36 (2002) 
811; and J. Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (Oxford 
University Press, 2007), pp. 27–30.
35 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale 
and Distribution of Bananas (EC – Bananas III), Wt/DS27/aB/r, adopted 25 September 
1997, paras. 221–2 (in which the appellate Body found that both the Gatt and the 
GatS could apply to the EC’s bananas regime because the agreements have independent 
scope and application, and may therefore overlap). See also discussion in Marceau and 
trachtman, supra, note 34, p. 863.
36 The panel in the EC – Biotech dispute found this to be the case. Panel report, European 
Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products (EC – 
Biotech), Wt/DS291/r, adopted 21 November 2006, paras. 7.165 and 7.172–7.173. See also 
Marceau and trachtman, supra, note 34, p. 865.
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well as the nature of the products. In a minority of countries, including 
austria, Belgium, Brazil, Germany, Portugal and Switzerland, imported 
kava products have been largely pharmaceutical in nature and regulated 
as drugs.37 a larger number of countries, including australia, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Singapore and Spain, have treated the 
kava products they import as food products and have regulated kava as a 
food.38 There are still other approaches. In the United States, kava prod-
ucts have been treated as neither foods nor drugs, but as herbal supple-
ments or nutraceuticals, whereas Canada regulates kava as both a food 
and a drug.39 
Notwithstanding the variety of measures described above, the major-
ity of importing countries appear to regulate kava as a food, and almost 
all of the import restriction notifications were made under the SPS 
agreement. accordingly, this chapter will limit its focus to the relevant 
SPS issues; however, it is important to bear in mind the potential rele-
vance of the tBt agreement and the Gatt to the regulation of indigen-
ous products.
The SPS Agreement and indigenous products
One of the areas in which the tension between national autonomy and the 
need for international rules is particularly acute is that of food and drug 
safety-standards setting. Some of the WtO’s most contentious cases, the 
EC – Hormones and EC – Biotech disputes, have arisen in this context.
to the extent that indigenous plant-based products such as kava are reg-
ulated as foods or otherwise fall within the ambit of the SPS agreement, 
such regulations must be based on a risk assessment40 which in turn must 
be supported by sound science.41 If there is insufficient relevant scientific 
evidence, Members may temporarily adopt provisional SPS measures.42 
In making risk management determinations – i.e. deciding what level 
of protection the Member wishes to achieve – Members must, inter alia, 
ensure that their measures are not more trade-restrictive than necessary 
to achieve the desired level of protection.43
37 WHO assessment, supra, note 7, p.55. 38 Ibid.
39 WHO assessment, supra, note 7, p. 55. 40 SPS agreement, supra, note 4, article 5.1.
41 See, for example, appellate Body report, Canada/United States – Continued Suspension of 
Obligations in the EC – Hormones Dispute (Canada/United States – Continued Suspension), 
Wt/DS320/aB/r, Wt/DS321/aB/r, adopted 14 November 2008, paras. 587–90.
42 SPS agreement, supra, note 4, article 5.7.
43 SPS agreement, supra, note 4, article 5.6.
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The SPS agreement has an entire article – article 3 – devoted to 
 harmonization. If WtO Members choose to base their SPS measures on 
international standards44 or conform their measures to such standards,45 
their measures will presumptively be deemed consistent with the SPS 
agreement and the Gatt.46 However, Members retain significant regu-
latory autonomy to impose measures that achieve a higher level of pro-
tection than the relevant international standard, ‘if there is a scientific 
justification, or as a consequence of the level of sanitary or phytosanitary 
protection a Member determines to be appropriate in accordance with 
the relevant provisions of paragraphs 1 through 8 of article 5’.47 a foot-
note to article 3.3 clarifies that ‘there is a scientific justification’ if, after 
examining and evaluating the available scientific evidence in accordance 
with the rest of the SPS agreement, a Member ‘determines that the 
relevant international standards … are not sufficient to achieve its appro-
priate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection’.48
Notwithstanding the text of articles 3.1 and 3.3, the appellate Body 
has rejected the view that these provisions operate as a rule and exception. 
In EC – Hormones, the appellate Body explained that ‘article 3.1 of the 
SPS agreement simply excludes from its scope of application the kinds of 
situations covered by article 3.3 of that agreement …’49 This interpret-
ation has been subject to criticism as the text of article 3.1 reads as a gen-
eral obligation followed by an exception provision.50 Furthermore, the 
general obligation/exception structure appears in both Gatt article III 
and article XX, yet the appellate Body declined to recognize this struc-
ture in SPS agreement article 3.51 Instead, the appellate Body elected to 
interpret the harmonization language of article 3.1 as aspirational rather 
than mandatory: ‘It is clear to us that harmonization of SPS measures 
of Members on the basis of international standards is projected in the 
agreement, as a goal, yet to be realized in the future.’52 Thus although 
44 SPS agreement, supra, note 4, article 3.1.
45 SPS agreement, supra, note 4, article 3.2.
46 Ibid. 47 SPS agreement, supra, note 4, article 3.3.
48 SPS agreement, supra, note 4, article 3.3 n.2.
49 EC – Hormones, supra, note 5, para. 104.
50 W. J. Davey, ‘reflections on the appellate Body Decision in the Hormones Case and the 
Meaning of the SPS agreement’ in G. a. Bermann and P. C. Mavroidis (eds.), Trade and 
Human Health and Safety (Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 118, at p. 120. Davey 
argues (pp. 124–5) that this interpretation strips article 3.1 not only of its logical mean-
ing, but of any significant meaning at all. If 3.1 is actually optional, then it is unclear why 
article 3.3 is needed.
51 See ibid.; appellate Body report, EC – Hormones, supra, note 5, paras. 103–9.
52 appellate Body report, EC – Hormones, supra, note 5, para. 165.
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article 3.1 states that Members ‘shall’ base their SPS measures on inter-
national standards where they exist, in practice Members may set stand-
ards higher if they determine the Codex or other international standards 
do not satisfy their own acceptable level of protection and there is a scien-
tific justification for therefore applying a higher standard.
The SPS agreement thus provides Members with a significant degree of 
regulatory autonomy to impose stringent safety measures, so long as the 
level of protection can be linked to a risk assessment. In the context of the 
kava bans, there are a number of uncertainties in this regard. Would a ban 
of all kava products be deemed sufficiently based on a risk assessment that 
showed potential correlations between new kava products and liver dam-
age? Would the application of the ban to all kava products fall within the 
scope of the Member’s policy space to manage risk? Or would such a ban 
be deemed more trade restrictive than necessary? The EC – Hormones and 
United States/Canada – Continued Suspension reports suggest there must 
be direct links between the particular product (in those cases, specific hor-
mones) and the particular product the Member seeks to minimize,53 but a 
scenario akin to that posed by the kava situation has yet to be adjudicated.
Whether or not the SPS agreement is sufficiently clear on this point, 
the kava experience signals that additional efforts should be considered 
to ensure that domestic regulations are not overbroad with respect to 
products that have multiple uses. In other words, regulations should be 
sufficiently narrowly tailored to only reach a harmful use of a product, 
rather than also capturing safe, alternative uses of the same product. For 
example, if a blend of a and B is toxic, it would seem appropriate to ban 
the use or sale of a and B together, but it would be overbroad to ban both 
a and B as toxic substances, even when sold separately. This concern is 
particularly acute in the context of indigenous products, as the long his-
tory of traditional use strongly suggests at least some measure of safety.
IV Potential solutions for indigenous products
It is well documented that developing countries and small economies face 
a variety of challenges – both structural and financial – in their efforts to 
comply with SPS measures imposed by importing countries.54 Most of the 
53 Canada/United States – Continued Suspension, supra, note 41, paras. 556–64 (discussing 
EC – Hormones and the level of specificity required).
54 See, for example, B. Shakya, ‘Nepal: Exports of ayurvedic Herbal remedies and SPS 
Issues’ in Gallagher et al., supra, note 28, p. 430 (using the example of good manufactur-
ing practices (GMP) applicable to ayurvedic herbal remedies).
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attention has focused on the costs of establishing food safety procedures 
that will satisfy would-be importers.55 However, these countries can also 
experience a different form of obstacle when importing countries deter-
mine that the products at issue are inherently unsafe, rather than tainted or 
at risk of taint. Under this scenario, developing countries can find their pre-
cious export markets disappear overnight, and the process of demonstrat-
ing actual safety and rebuilding trust can be difficult and lengthy. While 
aid for trade and other capacity-building efforts have been used to address 
the former problem, the latter has not received much attention. Yet we 
should also be concerned about – and attempt to ameliorate – the burdens 
overbroad safety determinations impose on fragile exporting economies.
as the kava saga demonstrates, there are good reasons to assess the 
safety of the traditional uses of indigenous products separately from the 
safety of newer, adapted uses. In particular, a risk assessment of an indi-
genous product which has a traditional use should assess the risk from 
the traditional use separate and in addition to, rather than aggregated 
together with, the assessment of risk from the adapted uses. to permit 
Members to do otherwise tilts the regulatory autonomy balance too far 
towards sovereignty at the expense of the legitimate expectations of par-
ticularly vulnerable members of the trading community. I am not propos-
ing revisiting the right of members to set their own desired levels of risk, 
nor advocating scrutiny of the legitimacy of such levels nor of the policies 
underlying them. Instead I am suggesting that measures that aggregate 
risks of indigenous products in their traditional and adapted forms run 
a significant risk of being more restrictive than necessary. This section 
canvasses various options for addressing the problem of overbroad SPS 
measures in the indigenous products context, beginning with dispute 
settlement, which, although a valuable option, has its own limitations.
Dispute settlement
It seems likely that Fiji56 could have successfully challenged the European 
regulations in a WtO dispute settlement proceeding as violating the SPS 
55 See, for example, J. E. Stiglitz and a. Charlton, Aid for Trade: A Report for the 
Commonwealth Secretariat (2006), p. 17, available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=joseph_stiglitz (accessed 9 December 2009) 
(noting that Hungary spent over $40 million to improve the sanitation levels in its slaugh-
terhouses in order to comply with importing members’ SPS measures).
56 Fiji is the WtO Member most affected by the kava bans. The other countries most signifi-
cantly affected – Samoa and Vanuatu – have yet to complete the WtO accession process 
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agreement for being more trade restrictive than necessary and, perhaps, 
for failing to align risk assessments with the measures taken. For develop-
ing countries, however, it is problematic to need to initiate dispute settle-
ment to obtain market access. They face obstacles in the form of lack of 
resources, expertise and sufficient staffing, and fear of reprisal from aid 
donors, which may render it difficult or undesirable to initiate disputes.57 
In addition, smaller and poorer countries do not have the economic where-
withal to retaliate in any significant way in order to induce compliance, 
in the event that the respondent member fails to comply with an adopted 
report.58 to the extent that dispute settlement is contemplated, however, 
the obstacles present in initiating a WtO dispute alleging violations of the 
SPS agreement are all the higher due to the complexity and uncertainty 
of the legal, factual and scientific issues.59 In light of the appellate Body’s 
recent decision in the Canada/United States – Hormones Suspension case, 
in which it imposed a more deferential standard of review of members’ 
SPS measures than had been applied in recent cases, it would be even 
more difficult for countries such as Fiji to challenge the EU’s SPS meas-
ures. The appellate Body indicated that the proper inquiry in reviewing a 
risk assessment undertaken pursuant to SPS agreement article 5.1 is ‘not 
to determine whether the risk assessment undertaken by a WtO Member 
is correct, but rather to determine whether that risk assessment is sup-
ported by coherent reasoning and respectable scientific evidence and is, 
in this sense, objectively justifiable’.60 In addition, a panel should deter-
mine ‘whether the particular conclusions drawn by the Member assessing 
and thus could not resolve this problem themselves through WtO dispute settlement 
processes.
57 For a discussion of the costs and effort involved for a developing country to initi-
ate a dispute, see D. tussie and V. Delich, ‘Dispute Settlement Between Developing 
Countries: argentina and Chilean Price Bands’ in Gallagher et al., supra, note 28, p. 23; 
see also C. P. Bown and B. M. Hoekman, ‘WtO Dispute Settlement and the Missing 
Developing Country Cases: Engaging the Private Sector’, Journal of International 
Economic Law, 8 (2005) 861, p. 866.
58 Scott, supra, note 34, p. 307; Bown and Hoekman, supra, note 57, p. 866; S. Charnovitz, 
‘rethinking WtO trade Sanctions’, American Journal of International Law, 95 (2001) 
792. In light of this problem antigua recently sought and obtained permission to ‘cross-
retaliate’ by suspending trIPS obligations in a dispute involving services commitments; 
however, antigua has not as yet suspended any such obligations. See Panel Report, United 
States – Measures to Control the Cross-border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, 
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Antigua and Barbuda, Wt/DS285/rW, adopted 22 
May 2007.
59 Scott, supra, note 34, p. 308.
60 Canada/United States – Continued Suspension, supra, note 41, para. 590.
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the risk find sufficient support in the scientific evidence relied upon’ and 
whether ‘the results of the risk assessment “sufficiently warrant” the SPS 
measure at issue’.61 While this decision has been applauded by many as re-
storing deference to national regulatory autonomy to an appropriate level, 
at the same time it will make it more difficult for WtO members such as 
Fiji to demonstrate the WtO-inconsistency of measures such as the kava 
ban.
Harmonization
One possible answer to the problem of overbroad SPS measures would be 
to increase harmonization. One of the common arguments in favour of 
more standardization in the SPS context is that it will improve develop-
ing countries’ ability to export. However, this appears to be borne out in 
practice only if the standardized approach is not too stringent. The exist-
ence of a Codex alimentarius Commission (Codex) standard does not 
preclude countries from adopting higher standards if they can satisfy 
the requirements of the SPS agreement. The EU adopts standards which 
apply across the EU and can thus be considered ‘harmonized’ but which 
may significantly exceed international standards. Empirical research has 
suggested that when this occurs, world exports, particularly from devel-
oping countries, are likely to decrease. If instead the EU were to adopt 
Codex guidelines in the form of an international standard, world exports 
would be more likely to rise significantly.62 This research suggests that, 
while harmonized food safety standards can lead to increased exports 
from developing countries, if the harmonized standard is set at a very 
high level it may negatively impact the ability of developing countries to 
export.63 
The most broadly applicable method of harmonization would be for 
Codex to develop more safety standards for indigenous products.64 The 
61 Ibid., para 591.
62 J. S. Wilson and t. Otsuki, ‘Food Safety and trade: Winners and Losers in a Non-
Harmonized World’, Journal of Economic Integration, 18(2) (2003) 266, pp. 284–5.
63 Ibid., p. 285. For a discussion of other implications of ‘regulatory export’ from stronger 
to weaker countries, see, for example, K. raustiala, ‘The architecture of International 
Cooperation: transgovernmental Networks & the Future of International Law’, Virginia 
Journal of International Law, 43 (2002) 1; a.-M. Slaughter, ‘Sovereignty and Power in a 
Networked World Order’, Stanford Journal of International Law, 40 (2004) 283, pp. 293–7 
(discussing raustiala’s findings).
64 Codex is jointly run by the World Health Organization and the UN’s Food and 
agriculture Organization. It establishes international standards for food regulations 
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WtO Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures monitors ‘the 
process of international harmonization and coordinate[s] efforts in this 
regard with the relevant international organizations’.65 WtO Members 
are encouraged to play an active role in these organizations, which include 
Codex.66
The SPS agreement encourages harmonization of standards and when 
a member’s food safety regulation is based on a Codex standard it will 
be presumed to be consistent with the SPS agreement. If an indigenous 
product is deemed a food, the producers therefore will need to be aware 
of whether Codex has established any standards relating to the prod-
uct. Indeed, at present, the kava-producing countries are seeking to have 
Codex establish standards for kava as it is traditionally used.67 Codex 
could agree to do this if it accepts the traditional use of kava as a food.68
Codex standards may or may not be helpful to the producers of indi-
genous products. First, developing countries may not have participated 
adequately in the standards-setting process.69 Because their voices are not 
always heard, a disconnect can result between standards established and 
the way products are used in the real world. Yet even without their partici-
pation, domestic product standards that conform to international stand-
ards are presumed to be consistent with WtO obligations. Notably in the 
EC – Sardines dispute, the appellate Body confirmed this understanding 
with respect to Codex rules, even where adopted by a bare majority vote 
that might not have included the support of the WtO Members involved 
in a given dispute.70 Joel trachtman has cautioned that ‘these types of 
quasi-legislation, delegated by the WtO to these other bodies, present 
important questions about democratic accountability, and about the cap-
acity of developing states to participate’.71 
such as the acceptable levels of contaminants that can be present and other types of 
quantitative criteria. See generally www.codexalimentarius.net/web/index_en.jsp 
(accessed 9 December 2009).
65 SPS agreement, supra, note 4, article 3.5.
66 SPS agreement, supra, note 4, article 3.4.
67 See Joint FaO/WHO Food Standards Programme, ‘Discussion Paper on the Development 
of a Standard for Kava’, CX/NaSWP/08/10/7 (September 2008).
68 The Pacific Island countries are not seeking to have Codex weigh in on the pharmaco-
logical uses because those uses fall outside Codex’s jurisdiction of food safety.
69 See generally, Food and agriculture Organization of the United Nations, ‘The Dynamics of 
Sanitary and technical requirements: assisting the Poor to Cope’, (rome, 2005), available 
at www.fao.org/docrep/009/a0011e/a0011E00.htm - tOC (accessed 9 December 2009).
70 appellate Body report, European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines, Wt/
DS231/aB/r, adopted 23 October 2002.
71 Joel trachtman, ‘The Constitutions of the WtO’, European Journal of International Law, 
17 (2006) 623, p. 639.
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In addition, Codex standards can only address food/SPS uses, and 
therefore cannot resolve situations involving indigenous products with 
purely medicinal uses, such as tea tree oil. Some have even criticized the 
application of Codex rules to natural and traditional health products, 
arguing that these products are fundamentally different from foods and 
therefore the regulations may not be appropriate.72
Harmonization is probably, on balance, preferable to no harmoniza-
tion, as an official international pronouncement of safe parameters is a 
useful benchmark to be able to point to. But because countries can adopt 
higher standards if they wish, harmonization cannot completely remove 
the problem of overbroad regulations.
Recognizing traditional uses
When assessing the safety of a product that is, or is derived from, an indi-
genous product, a distinction should be made between the traditional 
use and any relevant adapted uses. While the safety of the traditional use 
should not be given a free pass, it should be assessed as a stand-alone con-
sideration, separate from the assessment of the adapted uses (whether 
adapted by traditional or new users).
In considering the safety of the traditional use, members are of course 
entitled to use traditional scientific measures of safety. However, it should 
be noted that there is precedent internationally for recognizing the safety 
of items that have been in the food supply for a long time. For example, in 
the United States these are called ‘GraS’ or ‘generally recognized as safe’ 
items and include things such as vanilla, vinegar and caramel.73 Many 
years ago, a legal challenge was brought against an interpretation the US 
Food and Drug administration (FDa) had made of its regulations in 
which it found that language which provided that food safety could be 
established based on ‘common use in food’ prior to 1958 meant ‘common 
72 On the other hand, these products also seem to be different from drugs. Thus some have 
suggested that a third category should be created whereby natural and traditional prod-
ucts would be subject to their own laws, distinct from those applicable to foods or medi-
cines. This is the position of the New Zealand Health trust, for example, which advocates 
for natural health and therapeutic products to be regulated as a third category of prod-
uct, separate from either foods or medicines; www.nzhealthtrust.co.nz/pdf/aNZtPa_
Public_Briefing_Points_Summary_11_Feb_07.htm (accessed 9 December 2009).
73 See, for example, Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic act (Chemical additives in 
Food): Hearings on Hr 4475, Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate 
and Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1956), pp. 460–4 (statement of FDa 
Commissioner George Larrick).
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use in the United States’.74 The court rejected the FDa interpretation and 
found that foreign practice could be looked at.75 Subsequently the FDa 
amended its food additive and drug regulations to take into account the 
experience of other countries in its determinations of whether a product 
is ‘generally recognized as safe’ based on a long history of use in food.76 
Canada also differentiates between ordinary food products and ‘novel 
foods’, the latter of which are subject to a full review by Health Canada 
before they may be offered for sale. ‘Novel foods’ are those which, inter 
alia, do not ‘have a history of safe use as a food’.77
The EU is currently considering repealing its regulation on Novel 
Foods (regulation No 258/97)78 to, inter alia, introduce a new procedure 
for evaluating traditional foods from third countries. WtO Members 
have previously raised concerns regarding regulation No 258/97 and its 
earlier proposed amendments, arguing that the current and proposed 
measures impose excessive requirements to demonstrate the safety of 
food products with a long history of traditional use.79 In response, the 
EU has been evaluating a revision which would impose less onerous 
requirements for traditional food products from third countries with a 
demonstrated history of safe food use, than would be required of ‘novel 
foods’.80
Thus there is precedent for recognizing products as having a traditional 
use, and according such products a distinct status.
V What role for traditional knowledge?
This section considers how tK could be incorporated into assessments of 
SPS measures.
74 Fmali Herb v. Heckler, 715 F2d 1385 (9th Cir., 1983).
75 Ibid., pp. 1390–1. 76 21 C.F.r. § 170 (c)(2).
77 For details on the process by which it is determined whether a product is a regular 
food product or a novel one, see www.hc-sc.gc.ca/fn-an/gmf-agm/pol/index-eng/php 
(accessed 9 December 2009). The regulatory definition of ‘novel food’ appears in Division 
28 of the Food and Drug regulations at CrC c. 870.
78 regulation (EC) No 258/97 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 January 
1997.
79 WtO Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Note by the Secretariat, 
‘Summary of the Meeting of 29–30 March 2006’, (WtO Doc. G/SPS/r/40, 2006), pp. 
21–9.
80 ‘Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Novel 
Foods’, COM (2007) 872 final, 2008/0002 (COD), Brussels, (14 January 2008), p. 8.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Safety standards and indigenous products 187
Traditional use and traditional knowledge
as a framework for looking at the traditional use of indigenous prod-
ucts, I propose importing the concept of ‘traditional knowledge’ or tK, 
which has heretofore been discussed in the WtO exclusively in the con-
text of the trIPS agreement and intellectual property protection81 and 
which is commonly used to refer to plant and genetic resources of indi-
genous  peoples. There is no one accepted definition of tK, but medicinal 
and herbal plants would seem to fall within the scope of many of the 
definitions.82
The tK issue is not yet even close to resolution in the trIPS context, so 
it may be naïve to think it could be expanded to the SPS/tBt context. But 
it does seem that there is broad agreement that tK should be recognized. 
The issues are more to do with what value to assign to tK than whether it 
has a value, and in what contexts tK applies. If tK is recognized as hav-
ing a value in the IP context, this must mean it is connected to marketable 
products. These products would not have marketable value if they were 
demonstrably dangerous. If this is the case, then perhaps for products 
recognized as tK, it is reasonable for that tK to be taken into account in 
some way in the SPS/tBt safety analysis, particularly where the product 
at issue has both a traditional use and new, adapted uses.
This is not so different from the way Europeans currently address the 
safety of raw milk cheeses and cured meats. These products in many cases 
are accorded geographical indications – a form of intellectual property 
81 For example, whether traditional knowledge should be patentable or subject to other 
forms of intellectual property protection. This issue is primarily being considered in the 
context of trIPS article 27.3(b), which addresses the patentability or non-patentability 
of plant (and animal) inventions, and the protection to be afforded to plant varieties. 
Pursuant to the requirements of the trIPS agreement, a review is being conducted of 
article 27.3(b). In addition, Paragraph 19 of the 2001 Doha Declaration calls for the 
trIPS Council to look at, inter alia, the protection of traditional knowledge. See, for 
example, World trade Organization, Council for trade-related aspects of Intellectual 
Property rights, ‘The Protection of traditional Knowledge and Folklore: Summary of 
Issues raised and Points Made’, (WtO Doc. IP/C/W/370/rev.1, 2006); ‘trIPS: reviews, 
article 27.3(b) and related Issues’, available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/
art27_3b_background_e.htm (accessed 9 December 2009).
82 See t. Cottier and M. Panizzon, ‘Legal Perspectives on traditional Knowledge: the Case 
for Intellectual Property Protection’, Journal of International Economic Law, 7 (2004) 
371, p. 379. One definition referenced in WIPO’s Operational terms and Definitions for 
tK is ‘accumulated knowledge that is vital for conservation and sustainable use of bio-
logical resources and/or which is of socio-economic value, and which has been developed 
over the years in indigenous/local communities.’ See ibid., n. 37.
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protection – and are deemed safe, based on a long history of experience 
rather than on modern-day scientific testing.83
There are numerous possible ways tK could be taken into account in 
the SPS context. One possibility would be to allocate aid for trade or 
other trade-related capacity-building funding to fast-track safety analyses 
of the traditional uses of such products. another option would be for the 
SPS Committee to develop protocols for assessing the safety of the trad-
itional uses of indigenous products. It is beyond the scope of this chapter 
to assess the potential methods for taking tK into account; for present 
purposes I merely want to suggest that traditional knowledge could be a 
useful concept to import into the safety context to help prevent overbroad 
regulation of products that in all likelihood are safe.
Culture
The idea of using tK, or cultural knowledge, may seem inappropriate in 
the context of safety, which is usually seen as a scientific inquiry. However, 
‘culture’ does play a role in scientific risk assessments. We see it most com-
monly in the context of regulatory autonomy, when it is often argued that 
deference must be given to each nation’s own policy choices as to what it 
wants to protect against. Common examples in this respect are the policy 
choices of the EU and the United States with respect to health measures. 
The EU is far more concerned than the US over the safety of genetically 
modified organisms and growth hormones. In contrast, the US seems 
more concerned with cancer risks than the EU and also requires more 
detailed information on labels regarding fat content and cholesterol than 
does the EU.84 These policy choices reflect different cultural values.
83 M. a. Echols, ‘Food Safety regulation in the European Union and the United 
States: Different Cultures, Different Laws’, Columbia Journal of European Law, 4 (1998) 
525, p. 528. The recognition of geographical indications (GIs) for wine and spirits, and 
the ongoing discussions regarding expanding the scope of recognized geographical 
indications, reflect an acceptance that products originating from particular regions and 
production processes have a value that should be protected from exploitation by others. 
although owners of geographical indications tend to reject a link between GIs and 
traditional knowledge, in fact the two seem to be highly analogous, if not the same. See 
S. Frankel, ‘trademarks, traditional Knowledge and Cultural Intellectual Property’ 
in G. B. Dinwoodie and M. D. Janis, (eds.), Trademark Law and Theory (Cheltenham, 
Edward Elgar, 2008), pp. 452–3.
84 See, for example, B. a. Silverglade, ‘The WtO agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures: Weakening Food Safety regulations to Facilitate trade?’, Food and Drug Law 
Journal, 55 (2000) 517, p. 520 (noting EU objections to US labelling requirements).
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a further example is unpasteurized cheese. Due to the long experi-
ence in Europe with unpasteurized dairy products, unpasteurized cheese 
is widely available in Europe and generally considered to be safe. In the 
US, by contrast, pasteurization is associated with safety of dairy prod-
ucts and there are serious concerns about botulism and other problems 
being associated with unpasteurized cheese; hence, unpasteurized dairy 
products are heavily regulated in the US. at present the WtO permits 
these cultural differences by providing a degree of policy space for mem-
bers to reach their own decisions as to what is worth protecting. Some 
would argue there is not enough policy space there, and that in particular 
more flexibility is needed to take into account consumer preferences and 
to be able to take precautionary measures even when a degree of scientific 
information is available. 
regardless of whether one thinks the amount of policy space or regu-
latory autonomy is at an appropriate level, there surely is some room 
to make country-specific determinations as to what levels of risk are 
desired for different health and safety concerns. Science is then used, 
in the form of risk assessments, to implement these cultural decisions.85 
The EU in particular has defended its measures on grounds of consumer 
preference, even where scientific evidence of risk is lacking – in essence, 
justifying deferring to cultural attitudes.86 What I am proposing could 
be seen as the flip side of the equation: that culture – in the form of trad-
itional knowledge – should be taken into account in some way in deter-
mining how we go about the scientific process of safety assessment.87 In 
85 In the SPS context, the WtO has been criticized for not giving sufficient weight to the 
cultural factors that underlie risk assessments. See generally Scott, supra, note 34, p. 3. 
Contextual examples have included the EC’s restrictions on the importation of meat con-
taining hormones, and EC member country restrictions on the importation of genetic-
ally modified organisms, both of which of course have given rise to contentious dispute 
settlement proceedings. See EC – Hormones, supra, note 5; EC – Biotech, supra, note 36.
86 For example, EC – Hormones, supra, note 5, para. 245. For a discussion of the ways dif-
ferent cultural preferences for food safety regulation play out in the EU and the United 
States, see Echols, supra, note 83. See also M. trebilcock and J. Soloway, ‘International 
trade Policy and Domestic Food Safety regulation: The Case for Substantial Deference 
by the WtO Dispute Settlement Body under the SPS agreement’ in D. L. M. Kennedy 
and J. D. Southwick (eds.), The Political Economy of International Trade Law (Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), p. 557; H. F. Chang, ‘risk regulation, Endogenous Public 
Concerns, and the Hormones Dispute: Nothing to Fear but Fear Itself?’, Southern 
California Law Review, 77 (2004) 743, pp. 755–6 (discussing the EU’s preference for a pre-
cautionary approach in the areas of health and environmental protection).
87 Joanne Scott has criticized the silencing of culture in the SPS agreement, which she terms 
a technocratic zone. See ‘On Kith, Kine (and Crustaceans): trade and Environment in 
the EU and WtO’ in J. H. H. Weiler (ed.), The EU, the WTO, and the NAFTA: Towards 
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particular, when plants and plant products have a long history of a trad-
itional, common usage as foods and/or medicines, some value should 
be given – some recognition afforded – to the enduring practices of the 
indigenous communities from which these products originate.
Room for culture in risk assessment?
risk assessment is the first component of a risk analysis. Once the risk 
is assessed, the second stage is risk management where policy-makers 
determine what the acceptable level of risk is and how best to keep risk 
at or below that level. The first of these processes – risk assessment – is 
widely seen as a technical phase where scientific analysis is conducted. 
The second phase, risk management, is where value judgements are 
 traditionally identified.88
However, it is evident that the risk assessment phase also entails 
some decision-making. risk assessment generally entails four stages 
identified over 25 years ago by the National research Council in the 
United States. These stages are hazard identification, dose–response 
assessment, exposure assessment and risk characterization. Codex uses 
very similar categories – hazard identification, hazard characteriza-
tion (which includes dose–response assessment), exposure assessment 
and risk characterization.89 The SPS agreement defines risk assess-
ment similarly.90 While risk assessment is, on its surface, scientific 
and value-neutral, in fact scientists have to make all sorts of decisions, 
assumptions and other policy choices in conducting their analyses. an 
example would be deciding to use particular animal data to predict 
outcomes in humans, or to assume that the absorption rate in animals 
and humans is the same or close to the same.91 Indeed, these policy 
choices and assumptions are not consistent across regulatory bodies, 
a Common Law of International Trade? (Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 125, at 
p. 157; see also C. Button, The Power to Protect: Trade, Health and Uncertainty in the 
WTO (Oregon, Hart Publishing, 2004), ch. 4 (addressing the role of culture in shaping 
regulatory practice).
88 Button, supra, note 87, pp. 96–7. The appellate Body has rejected a rigid distinction 
between these two phases and appears to view at least some aspects of risk management 
as being within the SPS agreement’s scope. See ibid., pp. 101–2; EC – Hormones, supra, 
note 5, para. 181.
89 Button, supra, note 87, p. 96. 90 See SPS agreement, supra, note 4, annex a.
91 Button, supra, note 87, p. 97. These policy choices are often recorded. For example, the 
risk assessment policies used in generating Codex standards are documented in a joint 
FaO/WHO Consultation, ‘risk Management and Food Safety’, (FaO Food and Nutrition 
Paper 65, 1997), pp. 8–9 (cited in Button at p. 97 n. 17).
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meaning that different assumptions can lead to different outcomes. The 
risk assessment process has thus been subject to criticism as not being 
value-neutral in practice, and some argue the use of policy in the scien-
tific process undermines the legitimacy of using science to assess risk 
as it may impact the outcomes reached.92
Furthermore, even hazard identification may have cultural assumptions 
embedded into it. Europeans have been eating unpasteurized cheeses for 
centuries and thus do not see them as a potential hazard. Other countries 
with different cultural experiences may see these same products as poten-
tially dangerous.
It would seem that it would be within the normal parameters of the risk 
assessment process to identify the various potential uses of the product 
being assessed, and to assess each potential use. traditional knowledge 
can therefore be factored into the process merely by ensuring that the risk 
assessment includes a separate analysis of the safety of the traditional use. 
This would then avoid the problem of the traditional use being lumped 
together with the new uses. This approach would also be consistent with 
the appellate Body’s guidance in the EC – Hormones dispute, in which it 
cautioned that risk assessments should not be limited to laboratory exer-
cises but need to evaluate ‘risk in human societies as they actually exist 
where people live and work and die’.93
SPS Committee
It would not require any sort of wholesale changes in WtO rules or 
even in practice to take traditional knowledge into account. This type of 
understanding could be reached within the SPS Committee, which meets 
several times a year and discusses particular concerns of members.94 and 
so doing might help prevent a repetition of situations such as the six-year 
ban on all kava products. It would be appropriate for this recognition to 
take place in the SPS Committee. Given the expense and time involved in 
bringing a dispute, it would be much better to resolve such issues infor-
mally. It would also be in keeping with the SPS agreement’s provisions on 
special and differential treatment for developing countries. In particular, 
article 10.1 provides: ‘In the preparation and application of sanitary or 
92 See discussion in Button, supra, note 87, pp. 98–9 and footnotes therein.
93 EC – Hormones, supra, note 5, para. 187.
94 article 12 of the SPS agreement sets forth that the role of the SPS Committee is to serve 
as a forum for consultations relating to SPS issues.
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phytosanitary measures, Members shall take account of the special needs 
of developing country Members, and in particular of the least-developed 
country Members.’ This suggests that Members should assess the effects 
their SPS measures may have on developing countries, from the outset. 
The SPS Committee would be a useful forum for identifying traditional 
uses of products which Members are seeking to regulate.
VI Conclusion
The kava example suggests that the WtO’s health and safety rules may be 
used by Members in a way that can lead to overly strict regulation of indi-
genous products. I question whether any measures can or should be taken 
to ensure that Members’ risk assessments give weight where appropriate 
to traditional knowledge and product usage such that overbroad regula-
tions are minimized. In this regard, to the extent the safety of indigenous 
products are being called into question based on non-traditional uses, I 
posit that perhaps risk assessments of indigenous products should include 
an assessment of the safety of the product as it has been traditionally used, 
separate and apart from the analysis of the product as utilized inside the 
importing country. The concept of traditional knowledge may be a useful 
tool in identifying which products should be deemed to have a sufficient 
history of ‘traditional use’ to warrant a separate safety analysis.
  
